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And Its Relevance to some Contemporary 
Discussions on Consciousness 
by B a l á z s M. M E Z E I 
„One cannot leam a language 
unless one already knows a language." 
0erry Fodor)1 
y paper will be divided into five parts. In the first part I shall investigate some 
aspects of what we usually call „Cartesianism" referring to views described by 
Descartes in the Discourse and the Meditations. In the second part, I offer an analysis of 
what we may consider Husserl's Cartesianism. I argue that Husserl was a Cartesian, 
though not in the sense of the two substance theory of Cartesianism. In the third section 
I shall analyze Husserl's criticism of Descartes. In the fourth part, I shall attempt to show 
that Husserl was one-sided in his judgement concerning Descartes' thought. In the final 
section, I offer a brief overview of some trends in contemporary philosophy of conscious-
ness, and argue that Husserl's standpoint is a variation of what is usually called 'mental-
ism'. I am seeking to demonstrate that some central problems in contemporary research 
of consciousness were already seen and formulated by Husserl. 
I 
The term 'Cartesianism' is normally used to denote a metaphysical dualism between two 
independent substances, „mind" (res cogitans) and „body" (res extensa). That is how, for 
instance, John Searle understands Cartesianism in The Rediscovery of the Mind. In this dual-
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ism, the emphasis is on the radical diffference between two entities, mind and body, a the-
sis that is held to be inherent in Descartes' thought. At a closer view of Descartes' Discourse 
and Meditations, however, we must add to this popular conception of Cartesianism a series 
of other important features in Descartes' thought which equally deserve the term 
„Cartesianism", since each of them originates in a basic sense in Descartes' thought and 
each of them has made a spectacular career in the history of philosophy. We can summa-
rize these features under three headings: 
first, we may speak of Cartesianism in the sense of a systematic (or methodic) enterprise; 
secondly, in a methodological sense, and 
thirdly, in a sense which might be termed as the Cartesian conception of subjectivity. 
Cartesianism as a systematic enterprise is based on the idea that our knowledge of the uni-
verse and ourselves can be both exhaustive and systematically organized into a compre-
hensive scientific whole. The Cartesian conception of a universal science is based on the 
assumption that not only parts and moments of the universe can be objects of unified sci-
entific descriptions, but the totality of such parts or moments of the universe can be con-
sistently described. The idea returns in Spinoza's thought, and in Leibniz's idea of a ma th-
esis universalis. As is obvious, without this idea of Cartesianism as a systematic enterprise, 
the birth of the modern scientific world-view would have been impossible.2 
Methodological Cartesianism concerns three aspects of Cartesian philosophy: the 
method of universal doubt, the establishing of indubitable certainty which was to serve as 
the starting point of a universal and deductive science, and the assumption of a tran-
scendent guarantee which secures that our procedures are right. In some more detail: the 
method of universal doubt, or methodological skepticism, serves for Descartes to elimi-
nate any false or unclear idea he had of himself and of the world. In contradistinction to 
dogmatic skepticism, Descartes' methodological skepticism does not have a positive doc-
trinal content; it asserts only that the philosopher is supposed to doubt anything until he 
has a clear and distinct idea of what he accepts as true. This skepticism, as Descartes 
points out, is provisional: as soon as the first clear and distinct idea is found, skepticism 
as a general standpoint dissolves; it does not dissolve however concerning any idea other 
than the one intuited as clear and distinct. 
According to Descartes, indubitable certainty concerning one's own existence when-
ever one thinks of the „ego cogito" is the first clear and distinct idea one finds. The cogi-
to thus becomes the first principle of philosophy: beginning with this this idea, and fol-
lowing the geometrical method, one can arrive at various other principles, such as the dis-
tinction between res cogitans and res extensa. This distinction serves to liberate scientific 
investigation concerning the realm of the res extensa. 
In some of Descartes' arguments we find at the same time that a direct knowledge of 
God might even be more fundamental than the certainty of my own existence.3 This is 
what we might call a double foundation of Cartesian philosophy. The idea of God as the 
most perfect being is, according to Descartes, the ideal of any kind of knowledge which 
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claims to be clear and distinct. The idea of God is at least as certain as the truth of math-
ematical propositions.4 In Descartes' arguments, moreover, God is the guarantee that the 
first and indubitable starting point in our systematic thinking is not only an illusion; God 
is the ideal unity of knowledge and reality, of mind and body, in which the aspirations of 
a universal philosophy are fulfilled in a unique and perfect way. In other words, the con-
cept of God in Descartes' philosophy is a descriptive necessity without which philosophy 
more geometrico would prove to be a failure. 
The Cartesian conception of subjectivity is based on Descartes' thesis that, in any per-
ception, it is not only an equality of the evidences which I perceive between the evidence 
of an object on the one hand, and the evidence of my perceiving of the object on the 
other; rather, as Descartes says, the perception of my perceiving something has a stronger 
evidential character than the object or the content of my perception.5 The evidential or 
epistemological priority of the „perceiving myself in any perception" is a novelty indeed. 
For Aristotle, who already mentions the fact of apperception — that is the fact that, in any 
perception, I perceive my own perception — goes only so far as to say that „if we perceive, 
then we perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think".6 The Cartesian con-
ception of subjectivity thus introduces a distinction which might be even more important 
than the doctrine of the two substances: the distinction between subjective evidence, that 
is an evidence which concerns my own conscious activities, and objective evidence, that is 
an evidence which is about the content of any of my conscious activities. In Descartes' 
view, the former has a stronger evidential character than the latter. 
If there is a central concept of Cartesianism which may be considered as the common 
element in almost all the various conceptions of Cartesianism, then we have it in 
Descartes' thesis that the appreciation or my perceiving myself in any given perception, 
has a priority above all other forms of knowledge.7 The thesis of the primacy of the sub-
jective is not identical to the doctrine of the two substances; and I argue that it is not the 
latter which is central to Descartes' thought but it is rather the former which, from the 
point of view of a Husserlian Cartesianism, proves to be decisive in Husserl's philosophy. 
The doctrine of the two substances, if we are allowed to understand it in ontological terms 
at all, is only a derivation of the thesis of the primacy of the subjective. The thesis of the 
primacy of the subjective asserts that subjective evidence is immediate or direct, while 
objective evidence is mediated or indirect. Both have an evidential characater, yet they are 
grasped differently, according to their relevant status. That is, in other words, their dif-
ference is logical and not ontological. 
II 
Husserl's Cartesianism is to be understood on the basis of the various ramifications of the 
term „Cartesianism" explained briefly above. As Husserl explicitly says in the introduction 
to the Cartesian Meditations, Husserlian phenomenology is to be conceived of as a „new 
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form of transcendental philosophy", a kind of „Neo-Cartesianism". He adds however the 
rather surprising statement that this phenomenological Neo-Cartesianism „refuses to 
accept almost the whole known doctrine of Cartesian philosophy".81 shall return later to 
the question whether Husserl's statement concerning the difference between his phe-
nomenology and Descartes' philosophy is in fact so dramatic as he tends to think. In what 
follows however I shall investigate the problem of Husserl's Cartesianism in two ways: first 
in the mirror of the above classification of the term „Cartesianism", than in some more 
detail as to the fundamentally Cartesian features of Husserl's thought. I shall use some 
basic texts by Husserl which formulate clearly and in a summarizing fashion his under-
standing of Cartesianism. 
In general it may be said that we can find all the above types of Descartes' Cartesianism 
in Husserl's phenomenology: that is we find elements in Husserl's thought of 
Cartesianism as a systematic enterprise, methodological Cartesianism and also the 
Cartesianism of subjectivity. As to the first, Husserl understood phenomenology as a sys-
tematic enterprise which, having clarified the most important methodological and prin-
cipal questions, step by step expands its scope to all the possible fields of human knowl-
edge. Through this expansion, phenomenology becomes ever richer both in its content 
and in its history, going so far as to prove to be an „infinite task" of the human race. 
One must acknowledge that the method of Husserl's „science" is not that of the 
Cartesian „more geometrico"; in methodology, Husserl's Cartesianism lies not in the geo-
metrical method but rather in the epoche in which Husserl relies on Descartes' „method-
ological doubt". Just as Descartes decides, as he himself writes, to destroy the „house" of 
all previous knowledge and build a new one in which each element is submitted to rigor-
ous evidential inquiry9, Husserl too introduces his methodological doubt in which the 
naive and everyday belief in the existence of the world is suspended. Husserl's epoche how-
ever is a more complicated phenomenon than is Descartes' doubt. While Descartes' doubt 
is in fact methodological and concerns only the view how we see the world and ourselves, 
Husserl's epoche is a kind of „religious conversion". In this conversion, we not only gain a 
fundamentum inconcussum on which the system of the sciences can be built up, but more, 
we arrive at a genuinely new look at ourselves and our world, a new viewpoint in which, 
besides the meaning of the sciences and that of philosophy, the meaning of human life 
and history becomes clear. Husserl's complicated building of the various reductions which 
are based on the original act of the epoche makes the picture even more picturesque. In 
brief, all the various reductions are in a way parts of he Husserlian epoche in the sense that 
what is in principle initiated by the act of suspension (or bracketing) is applied and refined 
throughout the various reductions. Such reductions are for instance the eidetic reduction 
in which we grasp the essence of an object by imagining the same object in various situa-
tions and shapes: thus we can imagine the same tree as viewed from this or that angle, as 
blossoming or dried out, as alive or cut down, in the form of wooden instruments etc. 
What we grasp as the moment of identity in all these forms is equal to, according to 
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Husserl, the essence or eidos of a tree. All the various forms in which this eidos exists are 
aspects of the same eidos; that is, in contradistinction to the Platonic dualism, Husserl 
does not state any chorismos or gap between empirical forms and eidos, but rather consid-
ers all the factual and possible forms of a „tree" as belonging to the same eidos or essence 
of a „tree".10 
We have further in Husserl the transcendental reduction which locate the structure 
of all factual and possible eidetic forms as they are related to the conscious ego (according 
to the principle of apprehension); we also have the reduction of the natural sciences to 
their foundations in the life-world, and — to mention one more example — the absolute 
reduction in which the apprehensive moments are reduced to the absolute ego, the ego of 
all the possible structures and configurations of structures of any factual and possible 
experience. 
For Descartes, the cogito ergo sum is a conclusion of an argument accepted as logically 
indubitable. Descartes' cogito however is always the empirical, thinking I. For Husserl, 
this empirical thinking I is also submitted to the method of the epoche and is thus 
deprived of its natural or, as Husserl would say, psychological character. As Husserl 
explains, Descartes standpoint necessarily leads to what Husserl calls „transcendental real-
ism", that is to the standpoint that the peculiar evidence of my perceiving myself perceiv-
ing, though seen as different from the evidence of any object of perceiving, is still not 
understood in terms radically different from those of the objective world. For Husserl, 
Descartes confounds the psychological and the transcendental ego; that is, he does not 
clearly recognize the peculiar character of the evidence we gain as soon as we realize the 
ego's central role in any kind perception." As Husserl says, any evidence is a grasping of 
something exactly as something.'2 On the other hand, any evidence of particular objects 
can prove to be false, except the evidence we gain as soon as we grasp the subjective char-
acter of all evidences. In subjectivity, we have apodictic evidence, an evidence which can-
not prove to be false, since falsity too contains the evidence of my own being false. This 
apodictic evidence concerns only the ego, that is the subjective element in any perceiving 
of my own perception. The „world" — that is the presumptive totality of our perception — 
cannot be evident in the same manner; its evidence is not apodictic. The ego of the epoche 
is not, as Husserl writes, part of the „world" nor is this natural world part of my ego. 
Certainly, such a standpoint raises the danger of a Cartesianism in Searle's sense. But 
if the ego is not seen as the same kind of entity as the world of the natural objects, then 
there is no ground to believe that Husserl followed Descartes into such a dualism of sub-
stances. According to Husserl, the ego is not at all a substance — it is rather the identical 
substrate'3 of all factual and possible perception, a pole of identity which is necessarily 
implied in any experience. Moreover, the Husserlian ego, although radically different 
form the presumptive world, cannot be considered as independent from its own objects, 
that is from the content of its own experiences. The content of experiences is termed by 
Husserl as „noema"; and the way in which such contents are experienced is termed by him 
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as „noesis". Noesis and noema are correlates; none of them is existent without the other, 
and the structure of the ego is given precisely in this correlation, that is in the formal 
structure of such correlations. Husserl calls the investigation of this correlative structure 
„intentional analysis".14 
Perhaps the main characteristic of subjectivity in Husserl's thought is the ego's 
Eigenheitlichkeit or „ownness".15 In any experience, Husserl explains, the object of experi-
ence is given as 'something identical with itself. This givenness is however not static; only 
in the flux of experience are we able to perceive the object as 'something identical with 
itself. Or, as Husserl suggests, the identity of an object with itself is constituted in the 
explication of the perpetual flux of experience. Just as the object of experience is identi-
cal with itself before our perceiving it, and just as its identity can be grasped only in the 
flux of experience, the ego too is given before we perceive its presence in the experience 
itself; the ego's peculiar identity with itself however is grasped only during the process of 
perception.16 
The ownness of subjectivity is a feature which makes any experience meaningful. 
Normally, we do not perceive a tree, but rather we perceive something in relation to our 
perception. An experience is always an experience belonging to a subject, an experience 
of somebody, of myself, a feature which is essential to experience as such. A tree is always 
perceived through its qualia; but among all the qualia in the perception of a tree, the qualia 
that a perception is necessarily my own perception (mir-eigenes), in which I perceive that I 
perceive, is perhaps the most essential one. To put it in the words of the adverbial theory 
of perception we could say that we never perceive a „tree" as such but rather we perceive 
„treely" or „hously" or „worldly" in which the object of perception is a structural moment 
of the ownness-character of perception." The perception of a „tree" as such, a tree in the 
objective-biological sense, is an abstraction of something which I perceive „treely". This 
character of ownness, and further this character of the „my own" which is there in any 
piece of experience, is what makes subjectivity so crucial to experience as such. 
Ill 
The main emphasis of Husserl's Cartesianism lies in his understanding of subjectivity. In 
order to have a more precise understanding of this point, let us have a somewhat detailed 
look at Husserl's criticism of Descartes' thought. As mentioned above, Husserl has some 
polite words concerning Descartes' philosophy at the beginning of the Cartesian 
Mediations by recognizing his phenomenology as „Neo-Cartesianism". If however we con-
sider that at the same time he suggests the necessity of rejecting of „almost the whole con-
tent" of the Cartesian thought, we might attribute his words to the fact that, presenting 
the original version of his Cartesian Meditations, he spoke to a French audience. There are, 
then, two main passages in Husserl's main works which contain some substantial criti-
cisms of the Cartesian thought. 
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The one is in Cartesian Meditations.13 In the passage in question Husserl criticizes 
Descartes' conception of the ego or subjectivity in terms of a substance. For Husserl, a sub-
stance is an 'objective' entity; that is, an achievement of the subject's perceiving functions. 
On the other hand, the subject stands as it were outside the sphere of substances: the sub-
ject is the source of the substances, though not in the ontological sense of the word but 
rather taken from the point of view of the subject's perceiving processes. Thus, the sub-
ject itself cannot be a substance: it is, as mentioned above, rather a substrate, a pole of 
identity in the experience of substances which constitute, to use Husserl's expression, the 
world of substances. 
Descartes however states that the evidence of the ego cogito is axiomatic: in this evi-
dence, we discover the ontological difference between the res cogitans and the res extensa, 
recognizing thereby the axiomatic position of res cogitans. From the ego cogito as the prin-
ciple of absolute certainty we can deduce, by way of the geometrical method, a complete 
system of evidences which constitute the main structure of a universal science. 
For Husserl, Descartes' position is equal to what he calls „transcendental realism" 
which, as Husserl says, is a contradictio in adjecto. If we have a transcendental position, we 
acknowledge that, besides the sphere of objective entities, we have a primordial sphere, a 
subjective one which is categorically different from the sphere of objectivity. The law of 
causality belongs to this latter sphere; to say that there is a causal connection between tran-
scendental subjectivity on the one hand and its peculiar achievement or constitution „the 
objective world" on the other hand, is an inappropriate use of words. „Constitution" is 
not a causal process: it is the way in which we perceive ourselves and the world around us; 
it is the way human experience works. To say that this „way" is „something" in the sense 
as a tree is something and a perception is something, is to say that there is no categorial 
difference between something and the way something is perceived or given. But, Husserl 
argues, to say this is nonsensical: perception is always the perception in a certain way: it is 
always fragmentary, presumptive and is always in need of a complex a priori perceptual and 
conceptual scheme. 
We find Husserl's second criticism of Descartes' thought in The Crisis of the European 
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.19 Husserl's criticism is more detailed in this work 
than in the Cartesian Meditations. He addresses the following points in Descartes' thought: 
first, the question of the Cartesian epoche, second, the problem of the Cartesian mens sive 
anima sive intellectus; third, Descartes' purpose to apply the discovery of the first and indu-
bitable truth in a way which hindered him from recognizing the genuine nature of his dis-
covery. For Husserl, Descartes' methodological doubt was not at all consistent. Descartes 
„suspended" all his own earlier beliefs concerning the world, God and himself in order to 
arrive at the indubitable certainty of his own existence. Were Descartes more radical and 
consistent, he had been able to see that the subject of his indubitable certainty, the ego 
or subjectivity, cannot possess the kind of existence which we find in the objective world. 
In a radical suspension, Descartes should have suspended the belief in the existence of his 
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own ego as well. As Husserl suggests — although he does not go into detail in this respect— 
, if you suspend all your beliefs in the objective world, and if you are as an empirical per-
son part of this objective world, you cannot conclude that, once you perceive some kind 
of thinking taking place at a certain moment, that there is an empirical person who actu-
ally thinks. The logically coherent conclusion is that, once I perceive some kind of men-
tal process taking place, 1 realize that there is at least one mental process going on, there 
is thinking, without however supposing that there is also an empirical or quasi-empirical 
carrier of this thinking which Descartes calls mens sive anima sive intellectus. Husserl's point 
is that this mens sive anima sive intellectus can in no way be identical with an objective 
moment in the world; it is rather, as we have seen above, transcendental subjectivity, a sub-
jectivity which stands in a way outside the content of perception. 
The reason way Descartes did not see this point was, according to Husserl, that he pur-
sued some new 'scientific discovery'; his premiss was that there must be an ultimate and 
objective grounding for the objective sciences, a grounding which he identifies as the 
indubitable fact of one's own thinking. We could say that it was Descartes' „will for a uni-
versal system of the natural sciences" which hindered him from recognizing the genuine, 
transcendental character of subjectivity. At the same time, Husserl readily acknowledges 
the historical merit of Descartes' discovery; as he points out, Descartes' emphasis on the 
ego was the beginning of a radically new chapter in modern thought which led, through 
German transcendental philosophy, to Husserlian phenomenology. In Husserlian phe-
nomenology, the telos or hidden purpose behind this development comes to the fore: it 
becomes clear that the meaning of the history of philosophy culminates in the under-
standing of subjectivity as a realm logically different from what is usually dealt with in the 
natural sciences. The field of subjectivity, if properly approached, will lead to a revolu-
tionary re-evaluation not only of philosophy itself but also of the whole realm of natural 
sciences.20 
IV 
Now we may ask the question whether Husserl's understanding and criticism of 
Cartesianism is justified at all. As we have seen, Husserl has a complex understanding of 
Cartesianism which relies not so much on the tradition of Descartes' philosophy in ratio-
nalism and empiricism as rather on Descartes' thought taken in itself. While Husserl 
clearly relies on all the conceptions of Cartesianism roughly defined above, still, his criti-
cism of Descartes is not entirely just. Husserl, while refusing to consider seriously 
Descartes' arguments for God's existence, does not see the role of these proofs in the 
Cartesian system of thought.21 He does not see that the concept of God plays for Descartes 
a role similar to what the transcendental ego plays in Husserl's phenomenology — with the 
difference however that the Cartesian system is logically dualistic, and Husserl's philoso-
phy is rather monistic.22 When Descartes says that, as quoted above, we have in a way some 
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knowledge of infinity (of God) prior to our perception of ourselves as finite beings, he 
refers to a kind of tacit or apriori knowledge which serves as the structural basis of self-
knowledge in the sense of an empirical perception, and also in the sense of objective 
knowledge. Even if Descartes' point is ambiguous and far from being clear and distinct in 
this respect, some charity in interpretation could have helped Husserl to discover more in 
Descartes as he in fact did. 
Further, we find the famous passage in Descartes' Meditations in which he writes that 
„je suis, j'existe, est nécessairement vraie, tout les fois que je la prononce, ou que je 
la conçois en mon esprit".23 
In other words, Descartes tends to see the necessity of my own existence in connection to 
some mental acts; that is, he concieves of the necessity of subjectivity (of „myself) as an 
inherent feature of some mental acts. From this thesis it is obvious to conclude that the 
content of this necessity, that is the feature of subjectivity in the sense of the Husserlian 
„ownness", is an inherent feature of any mental act. As Descartes writes, enfin je suis le 
même qui sens, c'est-à-dire qui reçois et connais les choses comme par les organes des 
sens, puisqu'en effet je vois la lumière, j'ouïs le bruit, je ressens la chaleur. Mais l'on me 
dira que ces apparences sont fausses et que je dors. Qu'il soit ainsi: toutefois, à tout le 
moins, il est très certain qu'il me semble que je vois, que j'ouïs, et que je m'échauffe: et 
c'est proprement ce qui en mois s'appelle sentir, et cela, pris ainsi précisément, n'est 
rien autre chose que penser.24 
This passage clearly shows that Descartes was conscious of an important mental fea-
ture which later became to be termed as intentionality by Franz Brentano.25 But, precise-
ly, intentionality for Husserl is nothing else than the peculiar function of subjectivity, that 
is intentionality is not only, and it is not first of all, a „directedness to something" but 
rather the character that I conceive of something precisely as the content of my own per-
ception. 
Finally, we must mention the Cartesian conception of subjectivity. True, Descartes 
seems to tend to a kind of „Cartesianism" which we may term as the two substance theo-
ry of Cartesianism. On the other hand, his position is not so simple as Husserl wants to 
have it. Recall that, according to Descartes, I perceive myself with stronger evidence than 
I perceive the objective world. Now, given that Descartes did not possess the necessary 
conceptual means, we can evaluate this insight as a protoform of what was later to be 
termed „transcendental", and what Husserl identifies as his own phenomenological ver-
sion of transcendental subjectivity. Husserl is right when he points out that there is a log-
ical inconsistency in Descartes' argument of the cogito ergo sum: from the fact of my per-
ception of myself perceiving or thinking, I can conclude to my own, empirical existence if 
and only if I presuppose that empirical existence is implied in any thinking. If however I 
bracket, as Descartes promise to do, objective existence, then I bracket my own existence 
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as well. What remains is only a kind of perception of „myself as perceiving, but surely not 
myself as existing objectively in an objective world. Husserl's epoche relies precisely on the 
insight that, by bracketing or suspending the objective world, I suspend the validity of all 
my beliefs in which I conceive of myself as part of the objective world; yet, by carrying out 
the act of suspension, I do not stop perceiving myself as myself. The meaning of this 
„myself is quite different from the „myself understood in objective terms: 1 cannot be 
part of the exetmal world of objects.26 
Thus Husserl can be called a true Cartesian in various ways, but especially in relation 
to his understanding of subjectivity. The subject's peculiar stance, its relationship to the 
world of objects had never been addressed so radically and clearly as was done by 
Descartes. Even if the two substance theory is a misleading formulation of the subject's 
unique situation, it cannot conceal the importance of Descartes' original insight. Husserl, 
on the other hand, points out very clearly the flaw in Descartes' argument and develops 
it into a complex ontology of subjectivity. My task here will only be to consider this ontol-
ogy from the point of view of its central feature, that of ownness, and to see whether this 
Husserlian understanding of subjectivity has any relevance in contemporary philosophy of 
consciousness. 
V 
In contemporary philosophy of consciousness21 we have basically two main trends: the one 
we may call physicalism, the other, mentalism. Both attempt to offer an explanation o f 
subjectivity. While however physicalism does not consider subjectivity an independent 
problem but rather a problem of neuronal functioning under the popular title „subjec-
tivity", mentalism acknowledges that the problem of subjectivity is a problem in its own 
right. „Subjectivity", for the mentalist, is not only a name for a physical problem in the 
brain, but rather a problem which might not be explained in terms of neuronal functions 
as they are known today.28 That is to say, most mentalists do not question the possibility 
of finding an exhaustive explanation of subjectivity; but they are skeptical to the effect 
that this explanation can be offered on the basis of today's knowledge of the human brain. 
Some of them, as for instance Thomas Nagel or Roger Penrose, emphasize that it is strict-
ly impossible to find such an explanation on the basis of today's science; some others, as 
for instance John Searle, are satisfied with emphasizing the peculiarity of the problem of 
subjectivity, and while they define „subjectivity" or „consciousness" as a peculiar quality 
of brain functions,29 they do not see the necessity to explain this quality in its own terms. 
In my view, the complexity of the problem of consciousness or subjectivity30 excludes 
such reductionist solutions as those offered by for instance Daniel Dennett.31 If we look at 
a list of the difficulties, we might be more inclined to accept the view that if there is an 
explanation of consciousness, then this explanation lies outside the scope of today's sci-
ence; and if there is an explanation other than the one offered by the dualist John Eccles32, 
16.2 Bala&M. Me^ei 
this explanation might at least lead to a reformation of our scientific world-view — as is 
supposed to be the case by Roger Penrose. In any case, a list of the difficulties at hand may 
help us to see that Husserl's phenomenology of subjectivity had concentrated on prob-
lems of consciousness congenial to the birth of contemporary philosophy of mind. We 
might also see that the Husserlian ontology of consciousness, and especially its central 
Cartesian feature, is in many ways relevant to the contemporary discussion on subjectivity. 
A list of the problems with subjectivity implies, among others, the following elements: 
first the fundamental point that subjectivity is a property of the functions of the brain; then 
we have some subproperties of this property:^transparence, perspectivity and the present 
character of consciousness. Other problems are: the problem of the epistemic asymmetry; 
the problem of the qualia, the problem of the unity of consciousness, and so forth. In 
order to adjust myself to the limits of the present paper, I shall consider in some more 
detail the first four problems, and I shall mention some aspects of the other problems.33 
Subjectivity as a property. According to Daniel Dennett, the problem of subjectivity or 
consciousness is similar to the problem whether the sun in fact goes down on the hori-
zon. As soon as the real situation is discovered, that is the fact that it is the Earth that 
moves, the problem disappears. Similarly, Dennett believes, as soon as the real, neuronal 
basis of conscious phenomena are discovered, the problem of „consciousness" dissolves; 
what remains is only the structure and the functions of the neuronal networks in the 
brain. The problem with this simile is that while it is true that, with the discovery of the 
Earth's movement, the fact that the sun goes down proves to be an illusion, still, the phe-
nomenon of our perceiving the sun going down remains. An illusion remains an illusion 
even if it proves to be an illusion; and if the problem is about the nature of an illusion — 
that is, the nature of a conscious process — the answer that it is „only an illusion" does 
not make any sense. As Searle points out, 
„you can't disprove the existence of conscious experiences by proving that they are 
only an appearance disguising the underlying reality, because where consciousness is 
concerned, the existence of the appearance is the reality."34 
You could add that already the fact of „having illusions" about consciousness shows that 
consciousness is not a simple phenomenon: for having an illusion is already something 
which should be explained, and which can hardly be explained by reducing consciousness 
to the physical level. Searle holds, as mentioned above, that consciousness is in fact a prop-
erty, just as transparence is a property of H 2 0 . This insight, basically foreign to a 
Cartesianism of the two substances, was already pointed out by Franz Brentano in 1872: 
inasmuch as he defined intentionality as the property of mental phenomena, he declared 
that consciousness is a property. For Husserl, similarly, consciousness is a part or a 
moment of a complex to which there belong physical features as well as purely mental fea-
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tures. In the case of the perception of a physical object, what we have, according to 
Husserl, is a complex whole, a systematic structure, in which we can distinguish among 
various features: the feature of objectivity (the belief that the „object" exists „there", out-
side me), the feature of the object's being perceived by a subject, by me, the feature that 
this perception has a number of structural characteristics, it has a time-dimension, a space-
dimension, a realm of possible variations and so on. „Consciousness" is only one feature 
of this whole and, we might add, the Eigenheitlichkeit or ownness is also a feature of the 
object perceived. That is to say, for Husserl there is no „consciousness" outside, as it were, 
the actual and possible objects of perception; there is no subjectivity existing in itself in 
an abstract manner. Subjectivity is a fashion or a way in which perception takes place, a 
way which however proves to be fundamental in the sense that, in any act of perception, 
it is not consciousness which depends on the „objectively existing object", but rather the 
other way round: „objectively existing object" is a feature of the structure of perception. A 
proof of this, as Husserl holds, is that while we seem to perceive whole objects, in reality 
we cannot perceive them in their totality; perception of physical objects are always limit-
ed to a given point of view.35 
Once the expression „point of view" is mentioned, one recalls Thomas Nagel's theory 
of the „what is it like?".36 It is in fact surprising that Nagel has hit the Husserlian nail so 
much on the head. The point of Nagel's famous argument is that having a particular point 
of view is the main characteristic of subjectivity, together with the fact that in principle we 
can never know what it is like to be something different we actually are: we cannot know 
what it is like to be a bat. Now for Husserl the feature of Eigenheitlichkeit expresses some-
thing very similar to Nagel's „point of view". While however Nagel insists that any scien-
tific explanation of consciousness has to face this problem, Husserl has his own solution: 
for Husserl, Eigenheitlichkeit is a formal characteristic of consciousness, that is a funda-
mental term in his ontology of consciousness which should not be confused with a real 
point of view of a real object in the real (physical) world. As Husserl argues, any real point 
of view as a basic experience of any subject presupposes that „reality" is not a feature of 
perception but rather, something not dependent on perception. But this view is, precise-
ly, false. O n this view, ,,reality"is a feature of perception, just as consciousness is such a fea-
ture too. A real point of view must be understood in terms of Husserl's systematic 
approach: forget the „real" character of your point of view, and you will have point of view 
ueberhaupt, as a basic characteristic in a complex of perception, in which „you" as a real 
subject becomes, so to say, a transcendental subject. Even if this move might surprise you, 
you will agree that otherwise it is impossible to understand how human perception func-
tions. In other words, Husserl's approach to the problem of the „point of view" is sys-
tematic in the sense that he understands ,,the,point of view" perspective an intrinsic fea-
ture of a perceptual whole, and thus of consciousness or subjectivity, and thus escapes of 
the aporia given in Nagel's approach. For if we consider all the various real points of view 
substantially different from one another, we have to face the difficulty that, in spite of all 
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these differences, we know a lot of the other's point of view: how is this knowledge pos-
sible? If it is possible to bridge the gap between two points of view, then it is possible in 
virtue of a common element in the two, namely their being an intrinsic character of 
human perception. In other words: if you are able to learn a foreign language, Chinese or 
Hungarian, it is not because these languages are so much different from the languages you 
normally know; if you can learn these languages, it is because, as Chomsky suggests, there 
is a universal grammar inherent in the human mind, a grammar which makes in princi-
ple possible to learn and understand any human language. Similarly, any real point of view 
is comprehensible just as a given point of view in virtue of the fact that, besides our own 
real point of view, we have a „universal", or „transcendental" point of view in our minds. 
Husserl had in a way a deeper understanding of this fact than Nagel did. 
Transparence, perspectivity and the present character of consciousness. The trans-
parence of consciousness is the expression of the fact that, in any conscious state, one is 
directly at reality, so to say. That is, in any experience, we perceive the object of experience 
in a uniquely direct way, in a way which seems to stand in contradiction to the fact that 
perception runs through a number of intermediary physical—neuronal phases. We do not 
have any insight into these phases, into the neuronal processes in the brain; what we have 
is only a direct, clear, homogeneous and unified piece of experience. Husserl's answer to 
this difficulty is as follows: perception is not a causal process. It is not a process in which 
one real element physically affects another element which forwards the given impulse to 
a third element and so on. Rather, perception is a system of motivations in which physi-
cal or other objects play the role of motives.37 A motive is responsible for an initial effect; 
it is not responsible however for the kind and the structure, that is, for the quality of the 
effects. A motivation calls for, on Husserl's view, a number of complex reactions in con-
sciousness which are not determined by the initial effect. They are determined, rather, by 
their own structure or their own way of typical behaviour. To use a simple example: see-
ing a tree consciously is not so much making a photograph of the tree outside in the street 
as rather receiving the motivation „tree" and mobilizing all the relevant perceptual struc-
tures belonging to the motivation „tree". In this case, even if I perceive the tree from a cer-
tain point of view, it is not that particular point of view which I perceive but rather the 
tree itself in its totality: I perceive implicitly, for instance, all the parts and sides of the tree 
which I do not actually see. Transparence, thus, is a feature of being motivated: it is a fea-
ture of the structures of consciousness which are directly given; or, to put it in a rather 
provocative way, the explanation for the transparence of consciousness lies in the fact that 
what I perceive is above all consciousness itself — motivated always differently, according 
to the real state of affairs. 
The perspectivity of consciousness stands very close to Husserl's view of ownness as a 
central feature of subjectivity. Perspectivity denotes the fact that, in any perception, per-
ception and the subject of perception is always co-perceived. As Descartes would say, I 
always perceive my own perception, and I always think of myself, as it were, while think-
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ing. In any experience, there is the perspective of the subject of experience who, as Husserl 
would say, is not a substance standing in isolation from the act of perception. Any expe-
rience is subject-bound, and any experience, as mentioned above, is an experience in the 
fashion of Eigenheitlichkeit. While in transparence I perceive an object as immediately 
given to my perception, and thus as existing so to say objectively as a clear, unified and 
homogeneous object, in perspectivity I emphasize that this clear and homogeneous object 
is an object which I perceive — it is an object which is perceived by an I, a subject; I expe-
rience that, in the complex of perception, the perspective of subjectivity is an inherent fea-
ture. 
The present character of consciousness touches upon the time-dimension o f experi-
ence. In Husserl's phenomenology, the analysis of time in experience plays a crucial role. 
Husserl's ontology of time-consciousness is so complex and detailed that, for now, I men-
tion only that he does not only analyzes the present character of experience but rather the 
whole complex in which present, besides past and future, is only one feature. Present is a 
basic mood, of experience, yet it is some structural properties which explain our con-
sciousness of past and future as well. In retention I withhold what I experience as present 
and thus I make place for the past; and in protention I prolong the experience of present 
thus making possible what I experience as future. 
I have above defined Husserl's Cartesianism as concentrating on the peculiar nature 
of consciousness, rejecting however the two substance theory of Descartes. I have pointed 
out too that, in Descartes' analysis of subjective and objective evidence, he underlines the 
primacy of subjective evidence by emphasizing its immediate character. We have seen that 
some elements of this Cartesianism found place in Husserl's phenomenology; and that, 
in part at least, the same elements have proved to be central to the contemporary analysis 
of subjectivity. I am of course conscious of the fact that there are many pros and contras 
to Cartesianism in our discussions on the nature of the mind. Yet it seems to me that a 
modified form of Cartesianism, a Husserlian Cartesianism is so much in the centre of 
such discussions that it is impossible not to recall Husserlian insights whenever we touch-
es upon the central problems of subjectivity. This fact has already been recognized by 
other researchers; let me mention only Barry Smith, Dagfin Foellesdal and David 
Woodruff Smith. All have analyzed Husserlian themes in connection to contemporary 
discussions on consciousness, and all are acknowledged as contributing important ele-
ments to the debate. I only hope that my own contribution may also serve to clarify that 
Husserl — far from being a wicked and old-fashioned Cartesian whose philosophy should 
be substituted by the more up-to-date versions of phenomenology of, say, a Heidegger, a 
Sartre or a Derrida — was in reality one of the most eminent thinkers in our century 
whose ontology of consciousness and subjectivity is a rich repository of important 
insights. 
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